






On Some Doctrinal Disputations 
in Early Buddhist Interpretations of 
pratītyasamutpāda (Dependent Co-arising)
Abstract
Pratītyasamutpāda (Dependent Co-arising) is a foundational Buddhist teaching canonically 
announced by Buddha as that which represents his “middle position” between the two (on-
tological) extremes of existence and nonexistence. Nevertheless, early Buddhist philoso-
phers barely reached a consensus about its precise doctrinal or even grammatical meaning. 
In this article, I provide a basic outline of these disputations based on primary sources 
trying to show that they, in fact, reflect their various understandings of the problem of cau-








Cf.  a  grammatical  analysis  of  the  term  by 
Candrakīrti:	 “The	 verbal	 root	 I means  ‘mo-












ment’ or  ‘with regard  to’  [‘dependence on’]. 
The  verbal  root PAD,  preceded  by  [the  pre-
verb] samut [means] ‘appearance’ and so the 




ditions.” etirgatyarthaḥ, pratiḥ prāptyarthaḥ 
| upasargavaśena dhātvarthavipariṇāmāt 
– upasargeṇa dhātvartho balādanyatra nī-
yate | gaṅgāsalilamādhuryaṁ sāgareṇa 
yathāmbhasā || pratītyaśabdo’tra lyabantaḥ 
prāptāvapekṣāyāṁ vartate |  samutpūrvaḥ 
padiḥ prādurbhāvārtha iti samutpādaśabdaḥ 
































































“What  is  paṭiccasamuppāda?  Conditioned  by  birth,  Bhikkhus,  decay  and  death  [occurs]. 
Whether Tathāgatas arise or not, this property [or: base, dhātu] stands, namely [or: as] the stead-
fastness of phenomena (dhammaṭṭhitatā), the orderliness of phenomena (dhammaniyāmatā) or 
that-conditionality  (idappaccayatā). The Tathāgata  becomes  fully  awake  to  this  and  realises 







losophers  concerned  the  word  formation  of 
“pratītya”.	 Some	 of	 them	 (e.g.,	 Candrakīrti,	
the	 Vaibhāṣika  school,  Buddhaghosa)  held 
that  it  is  a  gerund  (“having  been  met/at-
tained”),	while	others	(mostly	the	Sautrāntika	
school,	 but	 also	 some	 Mādhyamikas)	 held	
that  it  is  a  secondary  derivative  noun  in  a 
sense of “those which are transient”. This al-
ternative  grammatical  analysis was  reported 
by Vasubandhu:  “Others,  however,  interpret 
[the  meaning  of  PS]  differently  in  order  to 
remove  this  criticism  [apparently  by  Gram-




noun],  i.e.,  ‘those which are  transient’. Pad, 
preceded by ut, means ‘appearance’. [There-
fore,  according  to  them], pratītyasamutpāda 
[means]  the co-arising  [‘arising  in combina-
tion’]  of  transient  [things]  under  this-and-
that  totality  of  causes.”  anye punarasya 
codyasya parihārārthamanyathā parikalpa-
yanti – pratirvīpsārthaḥ, itau sādhava 
ityāḥ = anavasthāyinaḥ, utpūrvaḥ padiḥ 
prādurbhāvārthaḥ, tāṃ tāṃ kāraṇasāmagrīṃ 
prati ityānāṃ samavāyenotpādaḥ pratītya-
samutpāda iti, Bhāṣya to AK 3. 28ab.
3
Inquiring  –  almost  rhetorically  –  why  Bud-
dha taught PS the way he did, Buddhaghosa 
explains  that  it  was  done  in  that  way  “be-
cause  of  the  complete  auspiciousness  (be-
neficence)  of  PS  [thought  in  that  way]  and 
because  he  himself  [Buddha]  has  obtained 
grace (elegance) in instructing PS [that way]. 
For  PS  is  entirely  auspicious  (beneficial).” 
Paṭiccasamuppādassa samantabhaddakattā 
sayañ ca desanāvilāsappattatā. Samantab-
haddako hi paṭiccasamuppādo  (Vsm. XVII, 
33).
4
Some  interpreters  of  Buddha’s  treatment  of 
language  saw  in him a precursor of  linguis-
tic  nominalism,  according  to  which  there 
is  no  inherent  or  “inborn”  relationship  be-
tween  words  and  things  “out  there”  with 
which  the  former  are  inevitable  associated. 
Language does not  reveal  any permanent or 
substantial “primary meanings”, but is being 
“freely”  constituted  in  public  usage  through 
generations just as any other human activity. 
Meanings  of  words  are,  so  to  speak,  arbi-
trary, dependent on the “speaker’s intention” 
(vivakṣā),  and  thereby  only  conventional. 
This line of thought was, of course, developed 
in  later  Indian  Grammarians’  (and  in  some 
Buddhists’)  speculations  and  some  of  Bud-




is  liberated  (vimuttacitta)  expresses  himself 
in  the way  it was  said  in  the world without 
being  attached  [to  these  expressions]”  (yañ 
ca loke vuttam tena voharati aparāmasan 
ti). Likewise,  at  the  end  of Poṭṭhapādasutta 
(D.  9)  Buddha  says:  “These  [such  as,  atta-
paṭilābha, etc.] are the world’s designations, 
the  world’s  expressions,  the  world’s  ways 
of  speaking,  the  world’s  descriptions,  with 
which the Tathāgata [i.e., Buddha] expresses 
himself, but without being attached [to these 
expression]”  (Imā kho, citta, lokasamañ-
ñā lokaniruttiyo lokavohārā lokapaññatti-
yo, yāhi tathāgato voharati aparāmasan ti). 
However,  taking  the  context  of  these  state-
ments  into  account,  they  are  hardly  proof 
that Buddha advanced full-fledged linguistic 






it.  This  still  does  not  necessarily mean  that 
Dharma expressed in his “technical termino-
logy” (PS, pañcaskandha, etc.) is also “con-
ventional”	 as	 was	 firmly	 held	 in	Mahāyāna	
Buddhism  (cf.,  for  example,  Vasubandhu’s 
Bhāṣya  to  Madhyānta-vibhanga  III.  22b, 
where all of Buddha’s so-called utterances or 





Buddha’s words  and utterances  are  revealed 
only  to  the  enlightened ones. The meanings 
of Buddha’s words are, so to speak, revealed 
gradually (and not at once) as one progresses 
on  the  Path.  But,  whatever  language  is  or 
whatever it refers to, all of its constituents be-














As  for  the abstract “qualifications” of PS enumerated  in  the above Sutta, 
Pāli	Commentaries	give	explanations	which	are	entirely	dependent	on	the	
later  abhidhammic  type  or  method  of  analysis.  Dhātu,  dhammaṭṭhitatā, 
dhammaniyāmatā  and  idappaccayatā  all  refer  to  the  inherent  nature  of 
conditions  (paccaya-sabhāva) which,  once present,  cannot  but  bring  into 
existence another (definite) dhamma(s), i.e., jāti (birth), once present, can-
not  but  “instigate”  jarā-maraṇa  (ageing  and  death)  to  occur,  etc.9  So,  at 
least	 according	 to	 the	 Theravāda	 Buddhist	 school	 (Buddhaghosa),	 these	
qualifications do not refer to something which is above dhamma-processes 
(the  distinction  between  the Law/Principle  and  its  “applications”  or  phe-
nomenal  occurrences),  but  point  to  the  very  nature  (dhammatā)  of  these 
processes  themselves  to which Buddha “became  fully  awake”. That  is  to 
say, the nature of dhamma-processes is these processes themselves as they 
occur and this “fact” is termed by Buddha as “paṭiccasamupāda”, that is, 
dhammaṭṭhitatā,  etc.  Sabhāva  (one’s  own  nature)  in  this  connection,  as 













































The  terms  sammuti-sacca  (‘conventional 







for  ‘the  highest  goal’.  Commonly  accepted 
linguistic  usage  (lokiya-vohāra,  based  on 
“general opinion”, sammuti; cf. Sasaki, 1992: 
79) is, for example, ‘being’ (satta) or ‘chariot’ 
(ratha),  to  take  famous  examples  from  S. 
I.  135,  although  no  such  things  exist  when 
closely  analysed  (Yathā hi aṅgasambhārā 
hoti saddo ratho iti; evaṃ khandhesu santesu, 






atthatas  or  paramaṭṭhena  (from  the  highest 
point or meaning) was added only in the later 
section  of  the  Canon  (Abhidhammapiṭaka 
and thereafter), announcing an analysis (and 
linguistic  expressions) of  reality  in  terms of 
compounded  and  uncompounded  dharmas. 
How  these  two  types of  linguistic usages or 
discourses  (cf.  also  the  neyyattha-nītattha 
distinction in A. I. 60) were “reified” as two 
distinct  types  of  truth  (sacca)  “without  a 
third” (cf. AA I. 95) or even “realities” (sat) 
in  Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika  (cf. AK  6.4.)  is 
not clear. Anyway, Mahāyāna and particular-
ly Madhyamaka seem to reinforce  the origi-
nal  meaning  of  paramattha  (paramārtha) 
as  ‘the  highest  goal’  which  has  nothing  in 
common with any kind of discourse, truth or 
analysed  reality,  including paramārthatas  in 
the abhidharma  sense, which  –  accordingly 
and inevitably – altogether belong to saṃvṛti 
(concealing/deceptive  reality),  including,  of 
course, Madhyamaka’s  discourse  itself.  The 
latter only indirectly (and hopefully) points to 
or  “makes  known”  (jñāpayati)  the Ultimate 
(cf. VV 64 and Commentary) through a par-






























ways – as  a  statement  referring  to universal 
truth  penetrated  by  Buddha,  as  an  explana-
tory  basis  or  frame  for  situating  his  teach-
ings, and as a practical argument for the pos-
sibility  and  efficiency of mental  cultivation. 
Linguistically,  PS  reveals  itself  as  a  proper 










put.”  (Ko nu kho, bhante, upādiyatīti? No 
kallo pañho ti bhagavā avoca – upādiyatī’ti 
ahaṃ na vadāmi. Upādiyatī’ti cāhaṃ va-
deyyaṃ, tatrassa kallo pañho –  ko nu kho, 
bhante, upādiyatīti? Evañcāhaṃ na vadāmi. 













is  only  a  temporal  difference  –  and  this  is  not  a  category  of  the paramat-
tha  type.19	The	Vaibhāṣika  school,  on  the other hand, burdens heavily  this 




In  the  Nidānasaṃyukta  (of  the  Saṃyuktāgama)  of  the  northern  Buddhist 
Canon,  there  is one Sūtra	without	a	counterpart	 in	 the	Pāli	Canon,	entitled	





Thus,  the eye, not being, becomes and, being,  it  ceases  [lit.,  ‘goes back’].21 There  is action, 
there  is  result, but except  for  the dharmasaṃketa, one does not maintain a doer who  throws 
away these skandhas and takes up again other skandhas. … Here this dharmasaṃketa [means] 

































a mere  “symbol”  (saṃketa)  of  reality  suited  for  human  understanding,30  a 
reality which is otherwise probably indescribable?
– kiṃpaccayā nu kho, bhante, upādānan’ti, 
esa kallo pañho  (Moḷiyaphaggunasutta,  S. 
2.1.2.2). Cf.  also M.  II.  9:  “Dhamma  is  ex-
plained/preached  in  a  causal  (connected) 
way,  not  in  a  non-causal  (non-connected) 





pendent co-arising,  that  is emptiness;  that  is 
based on conventional designation; only that 
is the middle path” (yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ 
śūnyatāṃ taṃ pracakṣmahe / sā prajñaptir 
upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā).
8
Katamo ca, bhikkhave, paṭiccasamuppādo? 
Jātipaccayā, bhikkhave, jarāmaraṇaṃ. Uppādā 
vā tathāgatānaṃ anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ, 
ṭhitāva sā dhātu dhammaniyāmatā idap-
paccayatā. Taṃ tathāgato abhisambujjhati 
abhisameti. Abhisambujjhitvā abhisametvā 
ācikkhati deseti paññāpeti paṭṭhapeti vivara-
ti vibhajati  uttānīkaroti. ‘Passathā’ti cāha–
’jātipaccayā, bhikkhave, jarāmaraṇaṃ’. … 
Iti kho, bhikkhave, yā tatra tathatā avitathatā 
anaññathatā idappaccayatā– ayaṃ vuccati, 
bhikkhave, paṭiccasamuppādo.
9
Ṭhitā vā sā dhātū ti, ṭhito va so paccaya-
sabhāvo, na kadāci jāti-jarā-maraṇassa 
paccayo na hoti … Paccayena hi paccay’ 
uppannā dhammā tiṭṭhanti: tasmā paccayo 
dhammā-ṭṭhitatā ti vuccati. Paccayo dhamme 
niyameti, tasmā dhamma-niyāmatā ti vuccati. 
Idappaccayatā ti, imesaṁ jarā-maraṇādīnaṁ 
paccayā idappaccayā, idappaccayā ca 
[Visuddhimagga:  eva]  idappaccayatā  (SA, 
Vol.  II,  40).  Idappacayatā  (lit.,  ‘that-condi-
tionality’)  is  thus  the  same  as  idappaccayā 
(‘that-conditions’) or, alternatively, as an ‘as-
semblage  of  conditions’  (paccayasamūha) 
–  “Because  there  is  a  condition  or  because 
there is an assemblage of conditions for those 
(occurrences) beginning with  jarāmaraṇa as 
already  stated,  it  is  called  idappaccayatā” 
(yathāvuttānaṁ etesaṁ jarāmaraṇādīnaṁ 
paccayato vā paccayasamūhato vā idap-
paccayatā ti vutto,  ibid.,  41;  cf.  also  Vsm, 
XVII,  6).  Tathāta, avitathatā, anaññathatā 
and idappaccayatā are epithets or synonyms 
for  “the  property  (or:  sign)  of  conditions” 
(paccayākāra)  –  “Because  each  particular 
dhamma  originates  through  [its]  particular 
[appropriate]  conditions,  neither  more  nor 
less, it is [called] suchness (tathatā). Because 
[once] conditions reach [their] completeness, 




tions  [appropriate]  to  some  other  dhamma, 
it  is  [called]  not-otherness  (anaññathatā) 
[for  the  interpretation  of  idappaccayatā  in 
this  context,  see  above,  paccayasamūha  as 
an ‘assemblage of conditions’]” – Tathatā ti 
ādīni paccayākārass’ eva vevacanāni: So tehi 
tehi paccayehi anūnādhikeh’ eva tassa tassa 
dhammassa sambhavato tathatā ti, sāmaggim-
upagatesu paccayesu muhuttam pi tato 
nibbattanadhammānaṁ asambhavābhāvato 
avitathatā ti, aññadhammapaccayehi aññad-





Dhammato añño kattā natthī ti dassetuṁ 
(Dīghanikāya-Ṭīkā, 673). The same text also 
mentions  another,  very  curious  reason  why 
sabhāva  is  introduced  in  the  “definition”  of 
dhamma – “because of the acceptance of the 
opinion of people who need to be instructed” 
(bodheyyajanānurodhavasena,  ibid.,  76),  cf. 
Karunadasa (1996: 15).
11
Katame ca, bhikkhave, paṭiccasamuppannā 
dhammā? Jarāmaraṇaṃ, bhikkhave, anic-
caṃ saṅkhataṃ paṭiccasamuppannaṃ kha-
yadhammaṃ vayadhammaṃ virāgadhammaṃ 
nirodhadhammaṃ.
12
Paṭiccasamuppādo ti paccayadhammā vedit-
abbā; paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā ti tehi tehi 
paccayehi nibbattadhammā,  Vsm,  XVII,  4; 
cf. also SA, ibid., 41, paṭicca-samuppannaṁ 
ti, paccaye nissāya uppannaṁ.
13
In  the  final  analysis,  there  is  no  difference 
between  PS  and  pratītyasamutpanna  be-
cause,  according  to  Śāstras  (presumably 





utpādyate ‘smāditi kṛtvā | phalabhūta-


















has  a beginning  (the  time aspect of  causality, dharmasaṃketa),  but  is  also 
beginningless (the actuality aspect of causality, paramārtha). Saṃghabhadra 




























A  thing or  phenomenon  is  PS, which  further means  that  “it”  is  nothing  in 
itself  or  by  itself  (niḥsvabhāva),  and  is  hence  a  bare  or  “empty”  (śūnya) 
phenomenon, whose  “positive”  existence  is  nothing  but  a mentally  gener-
ated “dependent designation” (upādāya prajñaptir). What can be said of phe-
nomena  “as  they  are”  (yathābhūta)  is  only  the mere  fact  of  conditionality 
(idaṃpratyayatāmātra), and there is no other way of establishing them.36 The 








For  Madhyamaka,  thus,  PS  is  a  mighty  “cure”  for  the  conceptualisa-
tion of  reality,  and our  inborn and obsessive  inclinations  towards  “things” 
phalabhāvāt | na caivaṃ satyavyavasthānaṃ 
bhavati, bhinnāpekṣatvāt | yadapekṣya pra-
tītyasamutpādo na tadevāpekṣya pratītya-
samutpannam, hetuphalavat pitṛputravacca, 




etadapyutsūtram; sūtre ‘nyathā nirdeśāt | 
“pratītyasamutpādaḥ katamaḥ? Yadutāsmin 
satīdaṃ bhavati” iti vistareṇoktvā iti yā “tra 
dharmatā dharmasthititā yāvadaviparyasta-
tā ayamucyate pratītyasamutpādaḥ” iti | 
dharmajātiḥ dharmāṇāṃ śailiḥ | ato yeyaṃ 
dharmatā ya eṣa niyamaḥ | avidyāyāmeva 









aviparītatā  (exactness),  together  with  the 
abovementioned aviparyastatā.
16
Cf.  also Cruise  (1983:  155):  “‘Causation’  is 
not one thing and ‘things involved in causa-
tion’ another … to be a thing is to be a causal 
thing,  to  be  conditioned  and  a  condition.” 
Kalupahana  (1975:  68),  on  the  other  hand, 
makes a “… distinction between a causal re-
lation (paṭicca-samuppāda) and  the causally 





Cf.  the  commentarial  explanation  of  Bud-
dha’s  famous  statement  “who  sees  dham-
ma  sees  paṭiccasamuppāda,  who  sees 
paṭiccasamuppāda  sees  dhamma”  –  “Who 
sees paṭiccasamuppāda sees conditions, who 
sees  dhamma  sees  dependently  co-arisen 
dhammas”  (yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati 




This  fact  is  also  reflected  in  well-known 
complementary  commentarial  “definitions” 
of  dhamma,  which  suggest  that  dhamma, 
sabhāva and paccaya are in the final instance 
one  and  the  same  “thing”:  “Dhammas  are 
so called as they bear their own nature”, At-
tano sabhāvaṁ dhārenti ti dhammā,  DhsA, 
126,  and  “Dhammas  are  so  called  as  they 
are  borne  by  their  conditions”,  Paccayehi 
dhāriyanti ti dhammā, DhsA, 63. In the same 
line of reasoning is Buddhaghosa’s criticism 
of  those  who  imagine  that  “idappaccayatā 
is  the essence (bhāva) of  that-conditions”  in 





[occurring]  in  formations when  there  is  that 
[particular  mode  in  ignorance  acting  as  a 
cause]”. Rejecting completely such an  inter-
pretation,  Buddhaghosa  underlines  that  “it 
is  ignorance,  etc.,  themselves  that  are  called 
‘cause’”. – Ye pi maññanti, idappaccayānaṁ 
bhāvo idappaccayatā – bhāvo ca nāma 
yo ākāro avijjādīnaṁ  saṅkhārādi-pātub-
hāve hetu so – tasmiṁ saṅkhāravikāre pa-




Abhidhamma,  a  mere  “concept”  (paññatti), 





not  existing paramatthatas,  become  support 
for  generating  consciousness  in  the  form 
of  shadow(s)  of  things  (ultimate)”  –  evam 
ādippabhedā pana paramatthato avijjamānā 
pi atthacchāyākārena cittuppādānam ālam-
banabhūtā, Abhidhammattha sangaha, VIII, 
29, 30. It could be said that time is understood 




The  entirety  of  this  Sūtra  (Saṃyuktāgama, 
335)  was  reconstructed  from  Chinese  by 
Lamotte  (1973), although  the part cited was 
already  reconstructed  by  Poussin  (cf.  n.  80 
in  chapter  nine  of  his  French  translation  of 
AKB).  This  part  of  the  Sūtra  was  cited  by 
Vasubandhu in his commentary to AK 3.18.
21





footing  in Buddha’s  own words;  cf. Bhāṣya 
to AK 5.27b.
22
Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtraṃ katamam/ cakṣur 
bhikṣava utpadyamānam na kutaścid āgac-
chati/ nirudhyamānam na kvacit saṁnicayam 





which  constantly  fuel  a  distorted  vision  of  reality  and  existence.  It,  at  the 
same  time,  mirrors  nirvāṇa  and  is  as  such  “defined”  by Madhyamaka  as 
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vati bhūtvā ca prativigacchatīti/ asti karmāsti 
vipākaḥ kārakas tu nopalabhyate ya imāṃś 
ca skandhān nikṣipaty anyāṃś ca skandhān 
pratisaṃdadhātyanyatra dharmasaṃketāt/ 
… anyatradharmasaṃketād iti/ atrāyaṃ 
dharmasaṃketo yad utāsmin satīdaṃ bha-
vati/ asyotpādād idam utpadyate/ yad idam 
avidyāpratyayāḥ … tatrāsminn asatīdaṃ na 
bhavati/ asya nirodhād idaṃ nirudhyate …
23
Etymologically,  saṃketa  comes  from  sam-
√CIT,	“to	observe	 together”	or	“to	agree	 to-
gether”,	and	so	it	is	semantically	close	to	Pāli	
sammuti	 (from	 sam√MAN,	 “to	 think	 toget-
her”) in a sense of general agreement.
24
Dve saccāni akkhāsi sambuddho vadataṃ 
varo sammutiṃ paramatthañ ca tatiyaṃ 
n’ūpalabbhati sanketavacanaṃ saccaṃ lo-
kasammutikāraṇaṃ paramatthavacanaṃ sac-









In PP 492.8  (Vṛtti  to MMK 24. 8),  saṃketa 
appears in the third “meaning” of saṃvṛti as 
(commonly  accepted)  expressions:  saṃvṛtiḥ 
saṃketo lokavyavahāra  –  “saṃvṛti  (means) 
conventional  worldly  designation”,  such  as, 
e.g.,  “name,  the  named  (the  object  of  nam-













Kiṁ saṁvṛtervyavasthānaṁ vaktavyam? 
idaṁpratyayatāmātreṇa saṁvṛteḥ siddhira-
bhyupagamyate,  PP.  54.24  –  “How  to  de-
clare  the  establishment of  the  conventional? 
The  establishment  (proof)  of  the  conven-
tional  is obtained by (the fact of) mere con-





ing  [i.e.,  conditioning;  cf.  a more  usual  ex-
pression parasparāpekṣā] each other.”
30
The  statement  asmin satīdaṃ bhavati,  etc., 
is  perfectly  in  conformity with ordinary hu-
man  experience  and  does  not  go  “beyond 
convention”  (cf.  sāmaññaṃ nātidhāveyya, 
M.  3.  230),  for  it  is  clear  to  everyone  that 
from  a  certain  seed  a  certain  fruit  emerges, 
that  where  there  are  harsh words  animosity 
inevitable  occurs,  etc.  These  are  observable 
facts and there is nothing obscure about them. 
Obscurity  and  contradictions  emerge,  as  is 
pointed out by Madhyamaka, when we try to 
impute (samāropa) to them certain “rational” 
or metaphysical  categories  (of  the  svabhāva 
type), which, instead of offering an explana-
tion, only obscure  the bare and plain fact of 
asmin satīdaṃ bhavati,  etc.  Thus,  various 
“theories”  (dṛṣṭi)  emerge  “about”  reality, 
i.e.,  causality  (svayaṃkṛtam,  paraṃkṛtam, 
etc.).  In  trying  to  “secure”  this plain  fact  of 
conditionality from “non-referential” imputa-
tions,	Candrakīrti	 says	 that	 “because	of	 [the	
undesirable]  consequence  of  substantialism 
and because it cannot be [otherwise] argued, 
[saṃvṛti is established by refuting a] fourfold 
thesis  [cf. MMK 1.1]”, na tu pakṣacatuṣṭay
ābhyupagamena sasvabhāvavādaprasaṅgāt, 
tasya cāyuktatvāt,  PP.  54.24–25.  Garfield’s 
(2003:  15)  observations  are  very  appealing 
in  respect  of  this  issue:  “Penetrating  to  the 
depths of being, we find ourselves back on the 






What  follows  is  taken  from  Sasaki  (1992: 
111–112); cf. also 109–110.
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To  my  knowledge,  Ābhidharmikas’s  at-
tempt  to  interpret  PS  explicitly  in  terms 
of  the  two  truths  is  the  only  such  attempt. 
Saṃghabhadra,  just  as  Mādhyamikas  (e.g., 
Buddhapālita),	 understands	 the	 canonical	
treatment of PS to be conventional (saṃvṛti, 
saṃketa)  in a sense that  it  refers only to  the 
arising  and  ceasing  of  psycho-physical  phe-
nomena  (the  three  lives’  explanation).  But, 
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O nekim doktrinarnim prijeporima 
u ranim buddhističkim interpretacijama  
»su-nastajanja u zavisnosti« (pratītyasamutpāda)
Sažetak
Pratītyasamutpāda (»su-nastajanje u zavisnosti«) temeljno je buddhističko učenje koje Budd-
ha naziva »srednjim putom« između ontoloških ekstrema egzistencije i neegzistencije. Unatoč 
tome, rani buddhistički filozofi nisu postigli konsenzus u pogledu njegova točnoga doktrinarnog 
ili čak gramatičkog značenja. U ovome članku dajem osnovne linije tih prijepora među ranim 
buddhističkim školama, temeljene na primarnim izvorima, nastojeći pokazati da oni zapravo 




Zu einigen doktrinellen Unstimmigkeiten 
in frühen buddhistischen Interpretationen  
des „Mit-Entstehens in Abhängigkeit“ (pratītyasamutpāda)
Zusammenfassung
Die pratītyasamutpāda („Mit-Entstehen in Abhängigkeit“) ist die grundlegende buddhistische 
Lehre, welche Buddha den „Mittleren Weg“ zwischen ontologischen Extremen der Existenz und 
Nichtexistenz nennt. Nichtsdestotrotz erreichten die frühen buddhistischen Philosophen keinen 





tikel erläutere ich die Grundlinien dieser Unstimmigkeiten zwischen den frühen buddhistischen 
Schulen, die auf primären Quellen fußen, indem ich zu schildern trachte, dass eigentlich diese 
Unstimmigkeiten ihre auseinandergehenden Auffassungen des Problems der Verursachung und 
Natur von Phänomenen widerspiegeln.
Schlüsselwörter
Verursachung, Madhyamaka, Phänomene (Dharmas), pratītyasamutpāda,	Vaibhāṣika, Vasubandhu
the  sphere  of  the  “psycho-physical”, which, 
when analysed properly (paramārthatas), re-
veals itself as a complicated causal structure 
bearing  on  such  functions  imagined  as  real 
(sat), as actuality (kāritra), potentiality or ca-
pability  (sāmarthya),  etc. Mādhyamikas,  on 
the other hand, insists on the conventionality 
of causation itself (“arising and ceasing”, i.e., 
saṃvṛti=idaṃpratyayatā,  cf.  n.  29  above) 
and  provides  a  completely  new  rendering 
of  PS  as  a  “non-arising”  (non-ceasing,  etc.) 
paramārthatas  (a qualification which is per-
sistently	 applied	 by	 Bhāviveka	 and	 not	 by	




two  (exegetical)  levels  –  suttantabhājanīya 
(according  to  canonical  discourses)  and 
abhidhammabhājanīya  (according  to  “more 





while  abhidhammabhājanīya  views  all  the 
limbs  of  PS  as  functions  in  each  and  every 
“thought  moment”  (viññānakhaṇa)  atempo-
rally  (i.e.,  causally),  systematically applying 















It  is  not  even  clear whether  PS  counts  only 
for conscious beings having in mind its “ab-





earliest  strata,  this  “concept”  “addresses  the 
workings of the mind alone” (2008: 299), and 
that the idappaccayatā, at least at this initial 
stage,  does  not  refer  to  the  general  or  “ab-
stract” causation principle of all “things” (not 
just mental or related to the mental), because 
it  [idappaccayatā]  “never  occurs  detached 
from  the  articulation of  the 12  links”  (ibid., 






count  for  non-living  or  non-human  “things” 
as well,  although  this  is  understandable  be-
cause of the well-known reason (the problem 
of  suffering)  that  Buddha  did  not  care  for 
“the  world”  outside  the  human  domain,  re-
ferring  only  occasionally  to  the  appearance 
of causal processes  in  the natural world and 
always by analogy with causal processes oc-
curring  in  the mental world,  as  for  example 
in S. III 54. Thus, Vasubandhu in Bhāṣya  to 





prākarṣikaḥ sāmbandhikaḥ sattvākhyo ’sat-
tvākhyaśceti bhedaḥ), and the reason why in 
the  sūtras  PS  pertains  only  to  living  beings 
is “to abandon perplexity regarding the past, 
the future and the present” [i.e., “did I or did 
I  not  exist  in  the  past”,  etc.]  –  kimarthaṃ 








(pratyayopāṇibandhatas)  applied  to  “outer” 






from  a  seed  (via  a  sprout,  a  leaf,  etc.).  (11) 
The conditional relation regarding this causal 














Sur quelques difficultés doctrinales 
dans les anciennes interprétations 
de la « coproduction conditionnée » (pratītyasamutpāda)
Résumé
Pratītyasamutpāda (« la coproduction conditionnée ») est l’enseignement bouddhique que le 
Bouddha nomme « la voie du milieu » entre deux extrêmes ontologiques, celles d’existence et 
de non-existence. Malgré cela, les anciens philosophes bouddhistes ne sont pas parvenus à un 
consensus autour de sa signification doctrinale précise, voire grammaticale. Dans cet article, 
je livre les traits principaux des difficultés présentes dans les anciennes écoles bouddhistes fon-
dées sur les sources premières, en essayant de montrer qu’en fait, elles reflètent leurs diverses 
compréhensions du problème de causalité et de la nature du phénomène. 
Mots-clés
causalité, Madhyamaka, phénomènes (dharma), pratītyasamutpāda,	Vaibhāṣika, Vasubandhu
in  Peṭakopadesa),  hetu  is  further  identi-
fied  with  sabhāva,  asādhāraṇa  (not  shared 
in  common),  and  pratyaya (paccaya)  with 





“mental  law”  (citta-niyama),  “kammic  law” 
(kamma-niyama),  and  “dhammic  law”  (for 




it  is  true,  as  Shulman  illustrates,  that  in  the 
earliest  sources  the  explication  of  PS  (and 
















[have  achieved]  complete  cessation  of  dif-
fuseness of naming and of other [alike] signs. 
And  so  this pratītyasamutpāda is  called  the 
[complete] appeasement of diffuseness.  In  it 




birth,  aging  and  death,  are  prevented  with-




amo’sminniti sa eva pratītyasamutpādaḥ 
prapañcopaśama ityucyate | cittacaittānāṁ 
ca tasminnapravṛttau jñānajñeyavyavahāra
nivṛttau jātijarāmaraṇādiniravaśeṣopadrava
rahitatvāt śivaḥ, PP. 11. 8–11.
